반응형
-
→ Samuel Lee Jun YK Shin 선생님 감사합니다^^ 한글로 설명하다보니 제 기능이 다시 High Context 모드로 돌아와 쩍하면 짝으로 이해될까나 하여 얼렁뚱땅 넘어 갈까했더니 딱 걸렸습니다 하하하 물론 [영어 잘하는 비법 1]부터 쭉 보신분들은 Low & High Context 문화에 대하여 그 유래와 사용되게된 배경을 다 이해 하셨겠지만 중간 뚝 짤라먹고 보면 제 무식의 수준이 거시기 해질밖에는 없군요^^ 하야~ 제목을 바꾸었습니다. 선생님처럼 하나 하나 따져야 영어를 잘할수 있다는 이야기도 앞글 어디에선가 언급했답니다^^ 요즘은 미국 컴뮤니티 칼리지에서 영어교육을 위해 Low & High Context 문화이해 접근법을 사용하기 시작했더군요. 수준 높은 반응을 보여주셔서 뭐 딱히 드릴건 없고 Close Friend로 페이스북 친구 setting을 올려드리겠습니다^^ 앞으로도 바보 도 통할수 있도록 많은 가르침 부~탁~해요! :) (y)
-
→ Samuel Lee 김용환 어른 같은 분이 많이 필요할 때같아요^^ Hyokyung Katie Kim님 정보 고마워요^^ <3 내 아가의 노래선물입니다^^ http://youtu.be/J4gVgPDmzHo
-
Jegook Lee 선생님의 촌철살인 평입니다 "웃겨요.서구대학의 석좌교수는 세계적 명성의 분들에게 수여되는 일생을 바친 학문에 대한 훈장. 전과자 정치인이 법대 석좌교수를 하는 ㅎㅎㅎㅎㅎ" - 대한민국 정말 꼴깝들을 떱니다.m.yna.co.kr
정·관계 요직을 지낸 인사들이 새 정부 출범과 함께 대학 석좌교수로 잇따라 자리를 옮기고 있다. 건국대는 박희태 전 국회의장을 법학전문대학원 석좌교수로 임용키로 했다고 최근 밝혔다. 박 전 의장은 '돈봉투 사건'으로 유죄를 선고받았으나 지난 1월 이명박 전 대통령이 단행한 특별사면을 받았다.
-
→ Samuel Lee 하는 짓거리 마다마다 꼬락서니를 보면 골때리는 인간들입니다.!!!!
-
→ Samuel Lee 울나라는 학교들부터 문제였네요.
-
[A US Nuclear Exit? (Part 2) How to close the US nuclear industry: Do nothing]
March 6, 2013 - By PennEnergy Editorial Staff
Source: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists
The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (BAS) has released its third and final issue in its Nuclear Exit series, this time turning its expert focus on the United States. The first two installments looked at Germany and France, countries that share a border but are - for historical, political, and economic reasons - answering the nuclear power question in different ways.
The second editorial piece in this five-part installment to be presented on PennEnergy.com comes from former NRC Commissioner Peter A. Bradford who writes in his engaging and somewhat counterintuitive essay, “How to close the US nuclear industry: Do nothing,” that the overall business-as-usual approach the US has to nuclear power is exactly what could lead to a US nuclear phase-out.
[How to close the US nuclear industry: Do nothing]
By Peter A. Bradford
[[Abstract]]
The United States is on course to all but exit the commercial nuclear power industry even if the country awakens to the dangers of climate change and adopts measures to favor low-carbon energy sources. Nuclear power had been in economic decline for more than three decades when the Bush administration launched a program that aimed to spark a nuclear power renaissance through subsidies and a reformed reactor licensing process. But Wall Street was already leery of the historically high costs of nuclear power. An abundance of natural gas, lower energy demand induced by the 2008 recession, increased energy-efficiency measures, nuclear’s rising cost estimates, and the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station further diminished prospects for private investment in new US nuclear plants. Without additional and significant governmental preferences for new nuclear construction, market forces will all but phase out the US nuclear fleet by midcentury.
Here’s what the US government must do to bring about a gradual phase-out of almost all US nuclear power plants: absolutely nothing. The United States is more or less on course to exit the commercial nuclear power industry, even if the country awakens to the dangers of climate change and adopts broad-based measures to favor low-carbon energy sources. only a massive, government-driven infusion of taxpayer or customer dollars, targeted specifically to new nuclear reactors, will produce a different result.
Dominion Resources Inc. recently announced that it will close the Kewaunee Power Station in Carlton, Wisconsin in 2013. The decision, said Dominion CEO Thomas Farrell, “was based purely on economics”. With that announcement, the 30-year struggle between pronuclear prophets and market realities in the United States appears to be entering a new phase, one in which market forces challenge the economic viability even of existing nuclear plants, while making new reactors hopelessly unattractive as investments.
The Kewaunee shutdown is not an anomaly. Duke Energy has announced that it will not restart the Crystal River unit in Florida, closed since 2009 by construction errors. In late 2012, both the Exelon Corporation and Xcel Energy Inc. canceled plans to expand existing nuclear units, citing declining forecasts of demand for electricity and long-term forecasts of low natural gas prices (Meredith and Benedetto, 2012). In January 2013, industry analysts speculated that several other units might also close in the near future for economic reasons (Maloney et al., 2013).
How could this possibly happen to an industry that was trumpeting a “nuclear renaissance” as recently as five years ago? Well, the nuclear renaissance was always ballyhoo; it was based on the number of reactors for which federal or state governments (or both) would conscript the necessary capital from captive taxpayers or customers, not the number that customers needed or that markets would fund. Absent an extremely large injection of government funding or further life extensions, the reactors currently operating are going to end their licensed lifetimes between now and the late 2050s. They will become part of an economics-driven US nuclear phase-out a couple of decades behind the government-led nuclear exit in Germany.
[[The renaissance that wasn’t]]
To understand why so many observers came for a time to believe in a US nuclear renaissance, it is helpful to review some US nuclear economic history, which has played out in five phases.
In phase one of that history, market forces had relatively little role in deciding what types of power plants were built. Between 1954 and 1978, electric utilities proposed nuclear and other types of power plants to state regulatory commissions that routinely approved them. Their costs were then reflected in the rates charged to customers, who bore the economic risks of overruns, plant cancellations, and poor operations.
In phase two, from roughly 1978 to 1990, rising nuclear construction costs met falling fossil fuel prices, emerging energy efficiency efforts, and the success of independent power generators enabled by the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978. The result was an end to nuclear construction in the United States.
Some reactors ordered in the 1970s were finished, but as many were canceled—a few after billions of dollars had been spent on them. During phases one and two, the United States both completed and canceled more reactors than any other two countries ever have.
During phase three in the 1990s, Congress encouraged competition among producers, allowing them to compete for the sale of electricity; the onset of retail customer choice actually caused a dozen or so operating nuclear plants to close, mostly out of fear that they would be unable to compete with cheap natural gas burned in combined-cycle power plants. The 104 surviving reactors upped their output by about 25 percent, lowering operating costs significantly and more than making up for the nuclear megawatts lost to the closures. As gas prices rose and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) developed its program for extending licenses, most of the nation’s reactors undertook to extend their licensed lives from 40 to 60 years.
In phase four, at the beginning of this century, nuclear power’s future in the United States seemed brighter than it had for several decades. True, no new reactors had been ordered for 25 years. But the Bush administration took office committed to reviving nuclear construction. The new administration, however, held two core beliefs incompatible with such a revival: that market forces, rather than the government, should determine resource allocation, and that the United States need not take significant action to reduce carbon emissions to combat climate change. In an intellectually untidy alliance with Democrats who believed in fighting climate change and were not averse to picking winners, the Republicans appeared ready to sweep away the antinuclear market verdict of the previous quarter century.
The Bush administration rolled out its “Nuclear Power 2010” program, with a goal of building two reactors by the end of 2010, thereby demonstrating that new designs certified through a reformed NRC licensing process would be credible competitors in the United States and global power markets. The leading nuclear industry trade association embraced a follow-on goal of 50,000 new nuclear megawatts by 2020.
Congress passed a significant taxpayer-backed incentive package for new reactors in 2005. In the Southeast, where electric industry restructuring had never taken hold, customers could not bypass costly utility power plants to buy directly from independent generators. In this region, several state legislatures passed laws providing much greater assurance that customers would pay for new nuclear plants years before receiving any electricity from them1 and that customers would also cover cost overruns and spending on canceled plants. Never before had investors been so sheltered from the economic risks of a company’s choice to build a nuclear plant.
By early 2009, the industry could point to 19 applications to build 29 new reactors on file at the NRC, with several more expected in the next few years. Now it is all in shambles. No further applications have been filed. Of those 29 potential new builds, at least five have been canceled outright. At least six more have been suspended with no real prospect for revival. The NRC carries in its “accepted/docketed” category another dozen reactors that no one has any intention of building.2 Licenses for four new units (of the original 29) were issued in early 2012. only those reactors and a Tennessee Valley Authority unit revived after 20 dormant years are moving forward with serious prospects of completion. Each of these has experienced cost overruns and delays. If they come on line at their current budgets, they will have demonstrated neither competitiveness nor real ability to control costs. Nuclear Power 2010 has joined the Bush administration’s list of missions not accomplished.
The first casualties of the post-2008 nuclear collapse were the reactors proposed for those regions of the country that choose their power generation through competitive market processes, usually from power plants whose prices and profits are no longer regulated by state utility commissions. More than half of all US electricity falls into this category, so Wall Street’s refusal to finance nuclear units in such power markets has ruled out most of the country as a home for new nuclear plants. Eight reactors vanished in Texas alone, as has every reactor proposed for the northeastern United States.
[[Competition killed the renaissance]]
Those who have not followed the development of competitive power markets over the past 35 years sometimes blame the collapse of new nuclear orders on a loss of public confidence and a surge in costly overregulation following the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island. If these were the true causes, the remedies might indeed lie in more political support and a streamlined licensing process, but neither evidence nor experience supports this scenario.
Nuclear power’s economic decline, including numerous cancellations and cost overruns, was well under way before the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island. Numerous operating and construction mishaps were attributable to the rapid growth in both number and size of reactors. These difficulties combined with very high capital costs in the mid-1970s to cause rate increases and corporate reassessments across the country. Irvin Bupp and Jean-Claude Derian’s definitive examination of nuclear economics, Light Water: How the Nuclear Dream Dissolved, was first published before Three Mile Island (Bupp and Derian, 1978).3
Nor is there a serious case to be made that interest in new reactors has been suppressed by decades of overregulation. The candidates for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission since 1980 have almost all been subject to what amounts to a nuclear industry veto.4 In many cases, they have had outright industry endorsement. The idea that these industry-vetted commissioners have overseen 30 years of excessive regulation doesn’t pass the straight-face test. Furthermore, no nuclear unit has so much as bid in a truly competitive power procurement process anywhere in the world. The inability to compete in countries like Britain cannot be traced to overreaction to Three Mile Island.
A 2003 MIT task force published a study titled “The Future of Nuclear Power.” The study did not consider efficiency and renewables to be among nuclear power’s competitors and did not address issues relating to nuclear regulation, but it was the best of several assessments of the fundamental economic status of new reactors. It estimated a new reactor cost of 6.7 cents per kilowatt-hour in a market in which power from new coal plants was thought to cost 4.2 cents, and gas-fired plants produced electricity costing between 3.8 and 5.6 cents, depending on the price of gas. It concluded that nuclear power in 2003 “is not an economically competitive choice” (MIT, 2003: 3).
But there was hope. The study posited four areas of potential improvement (construction time, construction cost, operation and maintenance, and cost of capital) that could together reduce the cost of new nuclear to 4.2 cents, fully competitive with coal and with gas at any but the lowest forecast price for the latter fuel.
To test the feasibility of these four improvements, the MIT study advocated a program of federal incentives (mostly in the form of production tax credits of 1.7 cents per kilowatt-hour) for up to 10 “first-mover plants,” which, presumably, represented several of the advanced designs expected to be certified under the reformed NRC licensing process.
Ten years have passed. The hopes of the MIT task force can now be contrasted with what actually happened to give a sense of the difficulties that nuclear power faces in the years ahead. For one, the relative economics of new nuclear power did not improve. In fact, they got much worse. Reactor cost estimates tripled as more realistic rate-case estimates and rising material costs replaced the lowball claims on which the Bush administration launched Nuclear Power 2010.5 This happened even though Congress in 2005 and 2007 passed incentive packages far more generous than the MIT study had advocated, while several state legislatures went even further.
Wall Street’s sense of the economic risk posed by new reactors was enhanced, not assuaged, by the events of the last decade. The gap between the cost of capital for a new reactor and a new fossil-fuel plant did not decline appreciably. Fukushima was of course the most dramatic illustration of the financial risk of nuclear power, but it was far from the most significant. An abundance of natural gas, lower energy demand induced by the 2008 recession, increased energy-efficiency measures, and nuclear’s rising cost estimates did the real damage. In fact, private capital for new nuclear was not available even before these events occurred. Investors knew that such developments were possible, and the risk of them—not the actual occurrence—was enough to foreclose private investment.
The United States did not adopt cap-and-trade legislation or any other broad-based approach favoring low-carbon energy. Furthermore, the price of carbon that has emerged in other markets was not nearly sufficient to close the cost gap between new nuclear and other low-carbon sources.6
After an initial burst of congressional and state legislative support from 2005 to 2007, further subsidies at the state and federal level were hard to come by. In part this was because the existing subsidies had not yet been put to use. In addition, efforts by the Obama administration and others to expand the subsidies have foundered as the failure of the government-supported Solyndra solar manufacturer, the disaster at Fukushima, and the emergence of abundant gas supplies have undermined both the political support and the economic justification for governmental intervention to prop up expensive energy technologies.
on top of the worsening cost picture for new reactors, the subsidies have proven less useful than the MIT task force had hoped. Production tax credits, which have been the cornerstone of the growth in wind energy production in the last decade, have been of much less use to nuclear power because, after all, they require production. Half of the reactors ever licensed in the United States were canceled before completion, so the promise of tax credits based on output was a sufficient incentive only in the states that had also provided assurances that the customers would pay the costs of canceled plants, and there were only half a dozen of those.
The loan guarantees for nuclear projects came with a requirement that the borrower pay a fee to the federal government consistent with the risk of default on the loans. For the first loan in a part of the United States that used power markets, the federal government set the fee at 11.6 percent of the guarantee, or $870 million for a loan guarantee of $7.5 billion. The would-be borrower of that amount, Constellation Energy, immediately withdrew from the Calvert Cliffs project, effectively killing what had been the flagship project for France’s advanced European Pressurized Reactor design (Wald, 2010).
only the state laws assuring that the customers will pay for new reactors no matter how unfavorable the economics seem capable of shifting enough risk away from investors that they actually will support new construction. Under shelter of these laws, coalitions led by Southern Company in Georgia and SCANA Corporation in South Carolina are well positioned to complete a total of four new reactors. However, a similar law has spawned a substantial political backlash in Florida, where four more new reactors are now further from completion than when they first filed for licenses, while Florida customers have paid well over $1 billion for them, money that is nonrefundable.7 Efforts to pass this type of legislation outside the South have repeatedly been turned back in campaigns in which the Florida experience has been prominently cited.8
one good measure of the erosion of nuclear power’s political support is its status in the recent presidential campaign, compared to the previous campaign. In 2008, Senator John McCain promised that his administration would assure the completion of 30 new reactors by 2030. Then-candidate Obama set no such quota but often announced strong support for new reactors. In 2012 neither candidate said much about nuclear power. on one telling occasion, former Deputy Energy Secretary Linda Stuntz, energy spokesperson for Republican candidate Mitt Romney, said of undertaking a new nuclear plant: “Right now, I think any board of directors for a utility would have to be nuts to say ‘We’re going to do this’” (O’Neill, 2012: 8).9
[[Picturing a US phase-out]]
The countries that have recently decided to phase out nuclear energy have done so by governmental fiat, complete with statutory deadlines both for individual reactors and for nuclear power in general. But no such sweeping action is really necessary in countries that have chosen to procure power generation through market mechanisms. The US experience demonstrates that absence of governmental intervention will create a glide path, determined in part by how long a country is prepared to allow its oldest reactors to operate, but in fact by the interplay between gas-driven electricity prices and the point in time at which older plants must make significant capital investments.10
Governments in countries with power markets that want to avoid a nuclear phase-out have to intervene just as vigorously to preserve the nuclear option as do governments seeking to close nuclear power down ahead of the economic life of the reactors. Great Britain, for example, has announced a major market intervention in which the government will pay the difference between the market price for electricity and an estimate of the price required by new nuclear plants (as well as by offshore wind towers) in pursuit of a more robust low-carbon energy portfolio. Since the estimated price to be paid for new nuclear is said to be at least 16 cents per kilowatt-hour—or about twice the existing market price for wholesale power generally—and the UK policy contemplates increases in customer bills well before any reactors come on line, the approach has something in common with the aforementioned state laws in the United States that have occasioned both new reactors and growing controversy.
Common to both the United States and the United Kingdom is the oft-stated hope that the projects will come on line “on time and on budget,” finally dispelling the spectacle of gigantic cost overruns and delays that plagued the last round of nuclear construction in the United States. But this hope ignores nuclear power’s deeper problem, which is that “on budget” isn’t going to stimulate much interest if it means “at a price more than twice the cost of getting the same electricity some other way.”
In 2006, MIT economist Paul Joskow created a simple graph on the status of nuclear power and illustrated the duration of nuclear power in the United States if no new reactors were built. The passage of seven years gives it a somewhat different aspect. The chart shows two different futures for the US nuclear industry. In both, no new reactors are constructed, but in one, all plants close at the end of their 40-year licensed lives, whereas in the other, they close after receiving license extensions for an additional 20 years. In the former case, the last US nuclear unit closes in 2038; in the latter, the final plant closes in 2058. Most plants having since received 20-year extensions, the 2058 line seems now to portray the no-new-plants case most accurately. Five plants do seem likely to come on line in the next decade, but this will occur even as equal or greater capacity closes before its licenses expire.11
[그림 Figure 1.] A look at the future? A chart that MIT economist Paul Joskow prepared for his 2006 presentation, “Prospects for nuclear power: A US perspective.” Credit: Paul L. Joskow, MIT.
When Joskow put forth this chart in 2006, few would have argued that it more or less described the US nuclear future. The 2003 MIT report had postulated a trebling of US nuclear generation by 2050. This was to be part of a similar growth spurt worldwide, seen as needed to preserve nuclear power as a significant contributor to the fight against climate change.
What seems much clearer now is that if the US government (and the states) do nothing to give additional strong preferences to new nuclear construction, the United States will more or less phase out its nuclear fleet on a schedule only a decade or two longer than would the government policy that caused such controversy when rolled out in Japan last September.12 Put another way, while the US Energy Department deplores the official nuclear phase-outs adopted by Germany and (sort of) by Japan, it is presiding over policies that will—if left to run their course—produce a remarkably similar result.
What a curious paradox. Every decade couples bullish US governmental forecasts of the nuclear construction surge to come with stentorian rebuke of the skeptics. Then every decade brings disappointing results that neither inform nor discourage the next generation of bullish forecasts. The Nixon administration’s 1973 forecast of 1,000 reactors by the year 2000 was the champion, but only by degree. Even today, small modular reactors are foreseen reversing the recent downward coast, never mind that they are unlicensed and economically unproven.
Meanwhile, other energy sources— efficiency, renewables, natural gas— follow the opposite trajectory, with each decade’s results exceeding the forecasts with which it began.
Imagine the start-up ceremony for the new reactors in Georgia or South Carolina in a few years: the president and the governor in the control room, pushing a symbolic button or two; the dignitaries, the regulators, and the unions hailing the nuclear turnabout just over the horizon; the president of Kazakhstan (a major uranium producer and part-owner of the Westinghouse Electric Co.) promising a lifetime’s reliable fuel supply.
Will anyone who matters tell them that they’re all naked?
[[Funding]]
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
[[Acknowledgements]]
This article is part of a three-part series on the implications of phasing out civilian nuclear power in Germany, France, and the United States. Additional editorial services for this series were made possible by grants to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists from Rockefeller Financial Services and the Civil Society Institute.
[[Article Notes]]
↵1 Conventional ratemaking allows recovery of investment from customers only after the plant begins serving them. This is also the financial result in the US states that rely on power markets rather than regulators to determine which plants get built and operate. In such markets, generators get paid only for generating capacity and output actually delivered to the grid, so plants under construction, like other industrial facilities, can’t recover costs until they operate.
↵2 The status of applications pending at the NRC is shown at: www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/new-licensing-files/expected-new-rx-applications.pdf. The NRC hasn’t updated this page since October 2011.
↵3 For a thorough analysis of the role of Three Mile Island in the context of making nuclear power uncompetitive in the 1980s, see Jonathan Koomey’s blog at: www.koomey.com/post/6868835852?dfa9e800.
↵4 In 1980, the CEO of the principal nuclear industry trade association described the industry’s reaction to Ronald Reagan’s victory over Jimmy Carter as “ecstasy, joy, pleasure, and euphoria” (Emshwiller, 1980). The next decade was the worst in nuclear power’s US history, with no new reactor starts, several dozen cancellations, the abandonment of the Clinch River breeder reactor, and the beginning of decades of slippage in the spent fuel disposal program.
↵5 The first two advanced reactor projects in Europe experienced dramatic delays and cost overruns as well.
↵6 The 2003 MIT study estimated that carbon taxes in the range of $100–$200 per ton would significantly affect the relative economics of nuclear compared to coal and gas, though with low gas prices the tax had to be at the upper end of the range for new nuclear to be competitive. In 2011, the Exelon Corporation released a review of the cost of low-carbon electricity generation that ranked new nuclear as more expensive than various combinations of efficiency, renewables, uprates of existing nuclear plants, and conversions of coal to gas.
↵7 See, for example, the Tampa Bay Times, “Progress Energy raises price tag, delays start date of Levy nuclear plant,” one of many excellent articles by Ivan Penn describing Florida’s recent nuclear experience (Penn, 2012).
↵8 Missouri and Iowa were the most prominent examples in 2012. North Carolina has a law only slightly less supportive than Florida’s, but when Duke Energy sought to make the North Carolina provisions identical, opponents were quick to cite Florida’s experience and the accompanying political turmoil. Duke was unsuccessful.
↵9 The Romney campaign did indicate support for improving nuclear prospects through licensing reform and a more effective waste disposal program.
↵10 By this standard, units at Crystal River and San onofre—currently closed by major equipment failures—appear to be serious shutdown candidates, though they may survive because they are located in Florida and California, respectively, states in which regulators can override market verdicts and impose their repair costs on customers.
↵11 Indeed, the next US nuclear unit that closes on the date that its license expires will be the first to do so. Most plant closings to date have been because expected profitability was insufficient to support necessary future expenditures.
↵12 The Innovative Strategy for Energy and Environment adopted by Japan’s Energy and Environment Council (but not by the Cabinet) in September 2012 commits to mobilizing all possible resources to phase out nuclear power during the 2030s. Since the government that propounded this policy has since been voted out of office, this document now lacks even the ambiguous status that it had in late 2012.
[[References]]
↵ Bupp I, Derian J-C (1978) Light Water: How the Nuclear Dream Dissolved. New York: Basic Books. Search Google Scholar
↵ Dominion Resources (2012) Dominion to close, decommission Kewaunee Power Station. Press release, October 22. Available at: http://dom.mediaroom.com/2012-10-22-Dominion-To-Close-Decommission-Kewaunee-Power-Station .
↵ Emshwiller J (1980) Nuclear power industry pins hopes for survival on Reagan presidency. Wall Street Journal, December 15, p. 27. Search Google Scholar
↵ Maloney P, Doley S, Ostroff J (2013) Operators do not plan merchant unit retirement. Nucleonics Week, January 10, p. 2. Search Google Scholar
↵ Meredith E, Benedetto G (2012) Glum economics skewer plans for nuclear uprates. Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, November 26, p. 4. Search Google Scholar
↵ MIT (2003) The future of nuclear power: An interdisciplinary MIT study. Available at: http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/ .
↵ O’Neill L (2012) Candidates tout pronuclear stances. Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, July 20, p. 8. Search Google Scholar
↵ Penn I (2012) Progress Energy raises price tag, delays start date of Levy nuclear plant. Tampa Bay Times, May 2. Available at: www.tampabay.com/news/business/energy/progress-energy-raises-price-tag-delays-start-date-of-levy-nuclear-plant/1227830 .
↵ Wald ML (2010) Fee dispute hinders plan for reactor. New York Times, October 10, p. A21. Available at: www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/business/energy-environment/10reactor.html .
[[Author biography]]
Peter A. Bradford teaches nuclear power and public policy at Vermont Law School. He chaired the New York and Maine utility regulatory agencies and served on the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. He advises and testifies on utility regulation and nuclear issues in the United States and elsewhere. He is a member of the Texas–Vermont Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact Commission and New York’s Moreland Commission on Utility Storm Preparation and Response.[A US Nuclear Exit? (Part 2) How to close the US nuclear industry: Do nothing]
March 6, 2013 - By PennEnergy Editorial Staff
Source: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists
The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (BAS) has released its third and final issue in its Nuclear Exit series, this time turning its expert focus on the United States. The first two installments looked at Germany and France, countries that share a border but are - for historical, political, and economic reasons - answering the nuclear power question in different ways.
The second editorial piece in this five-part installment to be presented on PennEnergy.com comes from former NRC Commissioner Peter A. Bradford who writes in his engaging and somewhat counterintuitive essay, “How to close the US nuclear industry: Do nothing,” that the overall business-as-usual approach the US has to nuclear power is exactly what could lead to a US nuclear phase-out.
[How to close the US nuclear industry: Do nothing]
By Peter A. Bradford
[[Abstract]]
The United States is on course to all but exit the commercial nuclear power industry even if the country awakens to the dangers of climate change and adopts measures to favor low-carbon energy sources. Nuclear power had been in economic decline for more than three decades when the Bush administration launched a program that aimed to spark a nuclear power renaissance through subsidies and a reformed reactor licensing process. But Wall Street was already leery of the historically high costs of nuclear power. An abundance of natural gas, lower energy demand induced by the 2008 recession, increased energy-efficiency measures, nuclear’s rising cost estimates, and the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station further diminished prospects for private investment in new US nuclear plants. Without additional and significant governmental preferences for new nuclear construction, market forces will all but phase out the US nuclear fleet by midcentury.
Here’s what the US government must do to bring about a -
이친구 페친 삼고 싶네요^^news.nate.com
[동아일보] 처음 찾은 낯선 곳에서 반대 방향으로 가는 버스를 타 낭패를 봤던 기억이 있다. 누구나 한 번쯤 겪었을 것이다. 그런데 언제부턴가 서울 정류장 노선도마다 버스의 진행방향을 표시한 빨간색 화살표 스티커가 붙으면서 헤매는 일이 줄어들었다. -
→ Samuel Lee 친구이자 페친인 이정전 김태동 이경희 이명현 석좌교수님들은 훌륭한 분들입니다.
-
→ Samuel Lee 악화가 양화를 구축하는법, 도맷금으로 넘어 갑니다. 학계도 정신차려야. 저질교수를 없애지 않으면 가치 하락하죠.
-
→ Samuel Lee 저러니, 교육이 제대로 되질않지..ㅊㅊ
-
→ Samuel Lee 진정성의 힘...
표창을 받고 2,000곳을 더 붙이는건 진정성 없이는 힘들죠 -
기가 막히고 코가 막히는 사람들입니다.
안철수가 동키호테 빨갱이라네요.
김동문이라는 이사람 '나주시민신문' 편집인이랍니다. 5.18항쟁이 북한군이 소행이라고 도배를 해놓았더군요. 젊은이들에게 잘못된 역사인식을 심는다는게 정말 큰일입니다. -
→ Samuel Lee 관상이 간신 거시기처럼 생긴 놈이...
-
→ Samuel Lee 실버 알바생이군요!!
-
→ Samuel Lee 꺼삐딴 kim...나셨네...기회주의자..상황에 따라 처신하는 카멜레온...
-
→ Samuel Lee 혈..~ 정말 황당합니다..
-
→ Samuel Lee 참 먹고사는 방법도 여러가지네..그래야 광고를 수주해오고, 신문팔아먹지요..
-
→ Samuel Lee 연세 드신분이 이게 할소리인가요?
-
→ Samuel Lee 퇴직 후 석좌교수라.. 결혼식 주례 많이들어오겠네요.. 전관예우..ㅎㅎ 주례비 많이들어오겠네요.. 세금은 제대로 내려나..ㅎㅎ
-
→ Samuel Lee 호남에서 아직 살아있는게 신기하네요^^
-
→ Samuel Lee Samuel Lee 이런 분들을 통해서도 배워야 합니다.
백년을 살아도 바르게 살지 못함은 하루를 살아도 바르게 삶만 못함을... -
→ Samuel Lee 이동네 페친이신 Jae-Yang Park 선생께서는 한국의 국론분열을 획책하는 남파간첩일꺼라고 하시더군요 하하하
-
→ Samuel Lee 맞습니다~맞구요 ㅎㅎㅎ
-
→ Samuel Lee 한국의 국론은 조선시대도 노론소론 파벌로 구론이 통일된적 없엇음..이때도 남파간첩이 있어야 햇나???
-
→ Samuel Lee 학생들은 얼마나 창피할까요 ㅎㅎㅎ
-
→ Samuel Lee 헛소린 집에서만 하시지...참
딱하네요 이런분들 보면 -
→ Samuel Lee 석고대죄의 줄임말이니 이분들은 석죄교수라고 불러야죠
-
→ Samuel Lee 참 안타까운 일입니다. 언론의 자유를 악용하는 이들에게는 버젓이 '자유'롭습니다. 하지만 모든이들이 이사람처럼 이 '자유'를 다 누리지 못하고 있다고 생각합니다. 왜 이러할까요?
-
→ Samuel Lee 남파간첩일수도 있겠네요..우찌 나주바닥에서 살까요~~~~저런사람 전라도에선 죽음인디..
우리 아이들까지 분노케 하는 그때 그일을..빨갱이소행이라고라..썩을놈 나이값 못하고
골빈소리만 하고 자빠졌네요.. -
→ Samuel Lee [김동문이라는 '나주시민신문' 편집인] 이 사람뿐만이 아닙니다. 이런 사람이 전국에 '~신문'이라는 간판을 걸고, 조직적으로 활동하고 있는 것 같습니다. 일련의 '~시민신문 편집인'이라는 집단을 파봤으면 좋겠습니다.
-
→ Samuel Lee 개쉐키
-
[유태인에게 배우자! 2]
제가 살고 있는 동네에는 ‘백인 vs. 마이너리티’가 아니라 ‘유태인 vs. 마이너리티’라 할 정도로 유태인들이 참 많이 살고 있습니다. 그덕에 유태인들을 지켜보며 정다운 이웃사촌으로 살아가고 있기는 한데요. 지난번 이곳에 올렸던 ‘유태인에게 배우자!1’에서 복습할께 하나 있지요.
바로, 소설가 양선규 선생님이 그분의 ‘인문학 스프- 싸움의 기술, 56. 유대인에게 배울 점’에서 “홍익희, 『유대인 이야기』”를 인용한 유대인사회를 유지하기 위한 유대인의 노력은 우리에게 너무 부러운 이야기로 다가옵니다. 그 내용을 보면:
“유대인들이 2차 이산 이후에 사방에 흩어진 종족들을 보존시키고 자신들의 서술적 정체성을 유지시키기 위해서 제정했던 공동체 수칙을 소개하면 다음과 같습니다.
1. 유대인이 노예로 끌려가면 인근 유대인 사회에서 7년 안에 몸값을 지불하고 찾아와야 한다.
2. 기도문과 토라(모세 5경) 독회를 통일적으로 유지한다.
3. 13세 이상의 성인 남자 열 명 이상이 모이면 반드시 종교집회를 갖는다.
4. 성인 남자 120명 이상의 커뮤니티는 독자적인 유대인 사회 센터를 만들고 유대법을 준수해야 한다.
5. 유대린 사회는 독자적인 세금제도를 만들어 거주국에 재정적인 부담을 주지 않아야 한다. 항상 비상시에 쓸 예금을 비축해 둔다.
6. 자녀 교육을 하지 못할 정도로 가난한 유대인을 방치하는 유대인 사회는 유대 율법에 위반된다. 유대인이면 누구든 유대인 사회의 도움을 청하고 받을 권리가 있다.
7. 유대인 사회는 독자적인 유대인 자녀들의 교육기관을 만들어 유지하고 경영할 의무가 있다. 가난한 유대인 가정의 아이들을 무료로 교육시키고 인재 양성을 위한 장학제도를 운영한다.
[홍익희, 『유대인 이야기』 참조]”
그런데 말입니다. 이 동네 골목마다 한두집은 꼭 한국가정이 있다는겁니다. 그것도 유태인 못지 않은 선민의식을 가진 고고한 한국분들이 한국사람들과는 잘 어울리지 않으면서 살고들 있답니다. 원래는 그러지 않았겠지요. 하지만 그리된 이유가 분명히 있을겁니다. 그건 아마도 군사독재정권에서 누렸던 특혜와 부정부패와 연관된 것이 아닌가 추측해 봅니다. 불편없이 세계 최고의 부자들이 모여사는 곳에 둥지를 틀었으니 말입니다.
문득, 우리 한국이 2천년전에 나라를 빼앗기고 여기저기 유태인들처럼, 집시족들처럼, 아르메니안인들 처럼 유랑생활을 했다면 과연 한민족의 정체성을 유지할수 있었을까를 생각해 봅니다. 할말은 많으나 여러분들을 위해 말을 아껴보겠습니다. 여러분은 어떻게 생각하시나요? -
→ Samuel Lee 교수님의 글은 지혜와 배움이 있습니다^^
-
→ Samuel Lee 이런 건 그냥 무시하면 됩니다.
-
→ Samuel Lee 유대인은 엄마가 유대인이어야 유대인으로 인정받습니다. 아버지는 상관 없습니다. 아마도 자녀 교육은 엄마와 밀접한 관계가 있기때문인것 같습니다.
-
-
→ Samuel Lee 우리학교 이름은 없길 바라면서 스크롤을 내렸는데..요즘 참 여러모로 부끄럽게하네요ㅠ
-
→ Samuel Lee 좋은 글 감사합니다. 공유합니다~~
-
→ Samuel Lee 보이지 않는 손의 하수인들이지요...
-
→ Samuel Lee 저자 사용하는 용어가 초딩 보다 못 한 용어를 사용하고 있습니다. 나주신문이라는 것을 나주 사람에게 물어 보니 모른다고 합니다.
-
→ Samuel Lee 고난과 시련속에서도 신앙. 배움과 교육. 자유와 개방. 신뢰와 교육으로 함께하는 유대인에게 배워야 겠습니다..^^
-
→ Samuel Lee 나주 살고 있는데 이런 사람이 있었네요....
-
→ Samuel Lee 역시적 배경이 다른데 비교하는 것은 무리가 아닐까요. 지역이 완전히 다른데요. 한고조 유방에 의해 고조선이 패망하고 고조선에 속한 각 집단들이 부여,옥저,동예,예맥,고구려등으로 독자적인 세력을 구축하고 중국의 파란만장한 역사에 직간접인 영항을 받습니다. 중국 또한 흉노,몽고,선비,여진,만주등 유목 민족과 대립,전쟁,협상,화친등으로 국가를 지킵니다. 우리도 당연히 영향을 받았구요. 한중일 삼국이 물고 물리는 구도구요. 중국에서는 확고부동한 봉건제가 너무 빨리 만들어져 우리는 그 영향을 많이 받았구요. 유가는 황제의 정통성을 지켜주는 방향으로 발전했구요. 우리는 더 강화돤 형태로 유교로 받아들여 발전 시켰구요.
민족론 위험 합니다. 사람 죽이는 일입니다. -
→ Samuel Lee 나주시민신문 오래전(15년 전?)에 잠깐 나오다 폐간된 신문이고요, 선친이 경찰이셨는데 육이오전쟁 때 좌익에 의해 목숨을 잃은 가족사가 있는 분입니다. 연세가 많으신 분이고 사고의 틀을 바꾸기는 쉽지 않은 분인데 그냥 사회의 여러 다양성으로 봐주시는 게 어떠실지...
-
→ Samuel Lee 아 갑갑하네
-
→ Samuel Lee 공동체를 유지하는 고유한 윤리가 사회마다 있는데, 민족주의의 개념과는 구분된다고 봅니다. 민족이 해체되었어도 살아남을 수 있는 것은 그 윤리인데 민족의 해체에 대한 반작용일 수도 있지만 유대교를 기반으로 형성된 공동체의 윤리가 확고한 기반을 가졌기 때문에 가능했겠죠. 우리 사회는 유교는 이미 권위를 상실했고. 종교들은 분할되어 있고 민주화운동의 경험을 윤리적 토대로 발전시키지 못한 상태라 이 모양 이 꼴인듯 합니다.
-
→ Samuel Lee 유대인의 공동체 윤리규범의 특징을 하나 더 발견했네요. 공동체의 단위가 소규모예요. 이러면 책임회피나 무임승차가 어려워지는 구조가 되겠네요.
-
→ Samuel Lee 사람눈에 사람이 돼지눈에 돼지만 보인다 했습니다
-
→ Samuel Lee 선생님.. 불행하게도 지금 대한민국엔 친일파 및 수구꼴통이 보수인척을 하며 그 반대인 사람은 무조건 빨갱이로 몰리는 현상이 두드러지고 있습니다. 그리고 중고등학생은 굉장히 우경화가 되어있다는 이야기를 선생이 직업인 친구들을 통해 많이 들었구요.. 뉴라이트가 교과서에 영향을 미치게 되면서 더 심각해 졌다고 하네요.. 많이 답답합니다..
-
→ Samuel Lee 제가 이해하는 이박사님의 이글은 유대인의 좋은점을 배우자는것이지 침략적인 요소나 민족 우월성을 옹호한점은 어느곳에서도 찾아볼수 없습니다. 따라서 "민족론 위험 합니다. 사람 죽이는 일입니다," 이글 적합한 지적이라고 생각되지 않습니다.
-
→ Samuel Lee 민족우월주의는 무섭고 위험한 발상임에 분명합니다. 하지만 오랜 역사속에 형성된 민족공동체의식은 그 바탕이 홍인인간과 같은 선하고 인류에게 도움이 되는 것은 지켜야 할만한 가치가 있는것이지요. 그래서 민족을 바탕으로한 국가들은 고도의 도덕성과 우수한 철학과 문화를 유지하려고 노력하고 그속에서 국가적 경쟁력을 발견하게 됩니다. 구한말, 민족론을 우스이 여기고 대동아공영론에 빠졌던 한심한 자들에 의해 우리는 몽고의 침탈에도 빼앗기지 않았던 국권, 나라를 빼았긴 민족이었습니다. 종교적 영성주의가 되었든 무정부주의가 되었든 민족을 우습게 여겨서는 않됩니다. 민족의 정체성을 지키는 것이 우리의 영혼을 지키는 길입니다. 그래서 더욱 유대민족의 현명함이 부러워지는 겁니다. 얕고 좁은 지식과 교양이 다인양 사람들을 현혹하고 미혹하게 만드는 일이 더이상 우리에게 있어서는 않되겠기에 절규하는 마음으로 정신차리자고 이야기하는것입니다.
-
→ Samuel Lee 20세기 변혁기에 우리나라는 유교제가 해체되며 새마을운동 바르게살기운동 정치권력의 지배수단으로 변질된 윤리교육을 제의하고 특별한 가치형성노력이 없었다는 생각입니다 ㅡ 의식주해결의 산업화 국민주권의 민주화운동은 사회구성윈간에 반감과 대립을 해소하지 못하지요ㅡ 북한주민 제외하더라도 5천만 남한에서 더이상 민족주의는 의미없고 다원화 다민족 자유 평화 복지 인권 등에 관한 보편적 정치철학이 사회 윤리교육으로 지향되고 있다고 봅니다
-
→ Samuel Lee 이게 말이 되는 말인가요ㅠㅠ
-
→ Samuel Lee 민족우월주의는 무섭고 위험한 발상임에 분명합니다. 하지만 오랜 역사속에 형성된 민족공동체의식은 그 바탕이 홍인인간과 같은 선하고 인류에게 도움이 되는 것은 지켜야 할만한 가치가 있는것이지요. 그래서 민족을 바탕으로한 국가들은 고도의 도덕성과 우수한 철학과 문화를 유지하려고 노력하고 그속에서 국가적 경쟁력을 발견하게 됩니다. 구한말, 민족론을 우스이 여기고 대동아공영론에 빠졌던 한심한 자들에 의해 우리는 몽고의 침탈에도 빼앗기지 않았던 국권, 나라를 빼았긴 민족이었습니다. 종교적 영성주의가 되었든 무정부주의가 되었든 민족을 우습게 여겨서는 않됩니다. 민족의 정체성을 지키는 것이 우리의 영혼을 지키는 길입니다. 그래서 더욱 유대민족의 현명함이 부러워지는 겁니다. 얕고 좁은 지식과 교양이 다인양 사람들을 현혹하고 미혹하게 만드는 일이 더이상 우리에게 있어서는 않되겠기에 절규하는 마음으로 정신차리자고 이야기하는것입니다.
-
→ Samuel Lee [질문]흩어지면 안되나요?
-
→ Samuel Lee [답] 뭉치고 싶은 분들은 뭉치고, 흩어지고 싶은 분은 흩어지세요. 각자가 옳다고 주장하지만 마시고 말이지요. 뭉치는자들도 존중해 주고 흩어지는자들도 존중하자고요.
-
→ Samuel Lee 미국에서 4반세기를 살면서 미국 구석구석 출장다니는 일을 하다보니 백인으로 Pak, Park, Lee, Ko 같은 성을 달고 사는 미국인들이 간혹 있더군요. 더러는 증조 고조할아버지쯤에 하와이에 살다 본토로 왔다는 이야기도 하더군요. 나라 빼았겼던 그래서 흩어졌던 사람들의 흔적이 저렇다는걸 몇번 보니 내가 고문받아 죽을것 같던 그 처참함보다 더 처참함을 느끼게 되더군요.
-
→ Samuel Lee 제가 구한말 하와이 한국선조의 뿌리를 찾아준 박 (Park)씨 성을 가진 친구입니다. 아쉽게도 더이상 한국인이 아니라 그냥 백인입니다. http://m.c.lnkd.licdn.com/mpr/mpr/shrink_80_80/p/2/000/002/254/1367260.jpg
-
→ Samuel Lee [질문]유대인은 단결이 잘 되나요?
-
→ Samuel Lee [답] 유대인은 현명합니다. 나보다 여러분이 더 잘 알잖아요.
-
→ Samuel Lee 유대인들이 단결 잘된다는것은 기정 사실(fact)아닙니까? 이 사실은 그들의 능력에서도 확인될수 있지요. 금융, 정치, 학계, 법조계, 예술계, 등등... 이사실이 사실 아닙니까?
-
→ Samuel Lee 한국 내부적으로는 대안이 없습니다. 남북한 7000만을 단일한 사상으로 묶어서는 안되구요. 결국 정치가 발전하는 수 밖에 없습니다. 그래서 그 혜택을 국민이 아주 조금씩 받구요. 유대교를 코어 삼아 민족을 유지 할 수는 없구요.더 중요한 것은 유대문화시스템 사람을 교육시키는 방대한 훈련체계가 한국은 없습니다. 하여 정치 발전이 경제, 안보를 향상 시키늣 방법 이외는 없다고 생각합니다. 한국 내부도 공동체는 약해지고 있습니다.
-
→ Samuel Lee 이상원 박사님께서 "단일한 사상으로 묶어" 야 한다는글 저는 위에글 어느곳에서도 못보았습니다. 너무나 주관적인 해석은 바람직 하지 않다고 생각합니다.
-
→ Samuel Lee 저 역시 "단일한 사상" 반대합니다.
-
→ Samuel Lee 아 그건요 박사님글 이 아니라 제가 보는 유대사회를 말하는 겁니다.
-
→ Samuel Lee 최소한 옆집에 밥굶는 아이는 챙기는, 남의 자식의 상처따위는 아랑곳 없이 내 자식 챙기기에 목숨을 거는 그런 사회는 않되어야지요. 제발!!
-
→ Samuel Lee 뜻을 같이하는 분들은 같이하는 겁니다. 싫으면 마는 것이지요. 다만 자신의 생각과 다르다고 자세히 알지도 못하면서 자신의 짧은 생각으로 재단하고 비판하고 비난하고 앞길을 막아서는 일은 하지말자는겁니다. 세상이 얼마나 복잡한데 스님 선문답하듯 질문하면 않되는겁니다.
-
→ Samuel Lee 페북에서 꼭 뜻을 같이 해야 하나요? 이런저런 의견을 말하면 안되고, 나와 다르면 안되나요? 질문도 해서는 안되구요. 이런저런 대화가 오고가면서 배우는 곳이 페북 아닌가요.
-
→ Samuel Lee 김지현 선생의 뜻을 모르는 바는 아니지만 각자 취향에 맞는 분들과 친구를 이루면서 자신이 원하는바로 페이스북을 하게되어 있지요. 취향이 같지 않으면 함께 하지 않으면 되는 겁니다. 5천페친과 일일이 토론하고 그런 시간이 없군요. 제 페북은 제가 관련된 장학회 봉사단을 활성화 하려는 뚜렸한 목적이 있습니다. 그점 양해 바랍니다.
-
→ Samuel Lee 페북 정관을 잘 알지못합니다. 하지만 제 상식엔 이페북은 이상원박사의 페북이므로 이분이 원하시는대로 하실수있다고 사료됩니다. 다만 인종차별이나 성적인 언어 폭행이나 타종교 비하등은 페북에서 문제가 분명히 될것이라고 생각합니다.
-
→ Samuel Lee 알겠습니다. ^^ 건승하세요. 페북의 위력은 알지만 ...
-
→ Samuel Lee 다행하게도 김지현 선생은 호우회나 전두환 추종자들에 비하면 너무 젊잖고 이어가시는 대화의 기법도 출중한 스님과 법문을 나누는 듯 하여 즐거운바도 있으나 제가 시간이 부족하군요
-
→ Samuel Lee 지구촌을 사는 우리는 다른민족의 좋은점은 당연히 배우고 나누워야 한다고 생각합니다. 이것이 진정 diversity를 celebrate 하는것이라고 믿고 있습니다.
-
→ Samuel Lee 저는 이대 연대 근처에서 살아서 데모 진압을 어떻게 하는지 똑똑히 본 사람입니다.저 중학교 때까지는 잔인했습니다. 제가 극우 포지션은 아닙니다.
-
→ Samuel Lee 잠간 뎃글 대화로 볼때 불교에 깊이가 있으신듯 합니다. 페친이어서 기쁘고 감사합니다^^ :)
-
→ Samuel Lee 강원도 양양 속초근처 강현에 산불이 났다는데 큰 산불인가요?
-
→ Samuel Lee 제가 있는 회사 랍니다.
-
→ Samuel Lee Taeyoung Yeo 선배님 바로 그말씀이 제 생각이기도 합니다^^ :)
-
→ Samuel Lee Yongseop Park, 용섭아~ 고마워~
-
→ Samuel Lee 미쳐가는 대한민국?
-
구국의 간성이 되길 ...오늘 2시 계룡대에서 박근혜 대통령 주관으로 육해공해병 통합임관식이 거행되었습니다. 5,780여명의 소위들이 반짝이는 다이아몬드를 어께에 달고 당당하고 우렁차게 '충성'하는 소리를 들으니 감격의 눈물이 나네요. 조국을 수호하는 자랑스러운 대한민국의 장교가 되리라 맹세하는 소위들을 보니 77년 임관식 기억이 엊그제같이 느껴집니다. 34년의 군생활의 만가지 기억들이 주마등같이 지나가며 조국이 필요로 하면 언제든 다시 군으로 돌아가서 봉사하리라 다짐해봅니다. 오늘 임관한 후배님들 부디 초심을 견지하며 훌륭한 리더가 되어 국가안보와 조국 수호에 일조하시기를 당부합니다.
자연앞에서 우리모두 겸손해야함을 태풍볼라벤을 겪으며 다시 느껴봅니다. 그러니 너무 과격함도 잘난척도말아야지 반성합니다.
태풍때문에 인생 한번 생각해봅니다.
태풍 피해보신 분들께 진심어린 위로와 지원을 보냅니다
-
→ Samuel Lee 갔는 구나. 시궁창으로. ㅎㅎㅎㅎ
-
→ Samuel Lee 상대적으로 그나마 군장교들이 깨끗한 편 아닌가요?
-
정치에 참여하기를 거부하는 가장 큰 벌은 저질의 인간들에 의해 결국 지배당하게 되는 것이다.
one of the penalties for refusing to participate in politics, is that you end up being governed by your inferiors. ~ Plato -
→ Samuel Lee 글쎄요... ^^
-
→ Samuel Lee 멋있습니다.. 과거 전두환때 입대를 심각히 고민하던때와는 다른 조국을 수호하는 멋진 장병들입니다.... 한편으론 부럽네요.. 이제는 강군을 만들어야 합니다...
-
→ Samuel Lee 멋진 정의.
-
→ Samuel Lee 대한민국 국군 화이팅!!!
-
→ Samuel Lee 지금 안보위기가 심각합니다...저들 중에 제 대학 동기들도 상당히 많은데 자신의 위치에서 영토, 영공, 영해를 수호해주길 기대합니다...ㅎㅎ 그리고 요새 북한 하는 꼬라지를 보니 저도 조만간 군복입을 준비를 해야될지도 모르겠네요 ㅎㅎ
-
→ Samuel Lee 명언중에 명언 ~~~
참으로 오랬만에 봄비가 오는듯~~~~ -
→ Samuel Lee 초심 잊지 않기를...
-
→ Samuel Lee 석좌교수라는 명예스러움이 땅에 떨어지는 인사군요. 부끄러운 한국의 모습입니다
-
-
→ Samuel Lee 사병이있기에 장교는 존재하는거란것만 똑바로 인식하길...
-
→ Samuel Lee 유감스럽게도 공감합니다.
-
→ Samuel Lee ROK NAVY 파이팅 선봉함대 파이팅!!
-
→ Samuel Lee 국호는 있는데 국혼은 없는 강시 상태입니다
-
→ Samuel Lee 돈이 필요한 모양-국고지원 받고 시퍼요 ㅎㅎ
반응형
'1. Dr. Sam Lee > 18_FaceBook_Twitter' 카테고리의 다른 글
| 2013년 3월9일 요즘 이야기 (0) | 2013.03.09 |
|---|---|
| 2013년 3월9일 Twitter 이야기 (0) | 2013.03.09 |
| 2013년 3월8일 Twitter 이야기 (0) | 2013.03.08 |
| 2013년 3월7일 Facebook 이야기 (0) | 2013.03.07 |
| 2013년 3월7일 요즘 이야기 (0) | 2013.03.07 |